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ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether the performance of credit unions that offer microcredit in Brazil was affected by the advent 
of Crescer – the National Microcredit Program. This research fills a gap in the literature because few papers investigate credit 
unions that work with microcredit and also the effects of governmental interventions related to microcredit operations. 
Studies of this type may help evaluate the impact of governmental interventions on the performance of the institutions that 
are directly or indirectly affected. Our results add to the debate about microcredit and about the inclusion of credit unions 
in this market. In particular, our evidence may influence the design of public policies and the strategies of microfinance 
institutions, which typically combine economic and social objectives. Based on the literature, we calculate fifteen indicators 
for each credit union, related to their financial and social performance. The inferences are based on the implementation of 
the difference in differences estimator using the advent of Crescer, in 2011, as the exogenous event of interest and including 
in the control group the credit unions that did not provide microcredit loans throughout the sample period. This research 
presents evidence that the volume of clients and microcredit operations performed by Brazilian credit unions was positively 
affected by regulatory changes that took place in 2011, consistently with the objectives of the governmental intervention. 
The evidence also suggests that the governmental intervention did not harm the financial sustainability of the credit unions. 
The main changes are: a substantial reduction of interest rates and transaction costs, the implementation of subsidies to 
participants in the program, and a push for public banks to enhance their supply of productive and oriented microcredit.
Keywords: microfinance, bank accounting, public policy, credit unions, performance indicators.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The microfinance segment covers all financial services 
aimed at the low income population, such as insurance, 
credit cards, saving, and microcredit, which is historically 
the most important among them (Aghion & Morduch, 
2005; Barone & Sader, 2008). 
Microcredit in Brazil is conceived in the context of the 
public policies for development and poverty reduction, 
and is considerably influenced by the regulatory and 
institutional environment and by specific governmental 
initiatives (Miguel, 2012). Among the most relevant of 
these are the National Oriented Productive Microcredit 
Program (NOPMP) and Crescer – the National 
Microcredit Program. In particular, the Crescer program, 
implemented in August 2011, introduced significant 
changes in the regulatory and institutional environment 
for short-term credit, stipulating a relevant reduction in 
interest rates and the opening credit rate (OCR) the final 
borrower is charged, establishing compensatory subsidies 
for institutions that adhered to the program, and creating 
microcredit provision targets for the public banks [Banco 
do Brasil (BB), Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB), Banco 
da Amazônia (BASA), and Caixa Econômica Federal 
(CEF)].
The aim of this research is to investigate the influence 
of the regulatory and institutional environment for 
microcredit on the performance of the credit unions 
involved with this activity, focusing as a laboratory on 
the impacts of the adoption of Crescer. It is argued 
that the governmental intervention has the potential to 
significantly affect the social and financial performance 
of relatively small microcredit providing institutions, 
as is the case of credit unions, due to its impacts on the 
profile of the borrowers of microcredit and on the costs 
and revenues structure. 
The studies in Brazil and the international ones that 
investigate the effects of regulation over the performance of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) have grown considerably 
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt & Morduch, 2008; Morduch, 1999). 
However, most (e.g., Christen & Rosenberg, 2000; Lauer 
& Staschen, 2013; Macchiavello, 2012; Martins, Winograd 
& Salles, 2002; Meagher, 2002; Rosales, 2000) address 
regulation in an abstract way, discussing whether MFIs 
should be regulated or not, or discussing “good practices” 
for regulation, from a normative perspective.  
This paper differs from previous ones by investigating 
the impact of a specific governmental intervention in 
the microcredit segment, also not evaluated in academic 
studies, over the performance of credit unions. For this, 
a new database was built, originating from the Brazilian 
Central Bank (CB) and containing microdata related to 
all the credit unions in the country in the period from 
2008 to 2014. Besides contributing to the academic debate, 
the results of the research may interest regulators directly, 
providing new information from the perspective of the 
institutions involved, which may be useful in terms 
of evaluating and improving microcredit policies and 
programs.
The empirical strategy explores the advent of the 
Crescer program as a natural experiment that directly 
and indirectly covers the subset of credit unions that work 
with microcredit. Credit unions that are comparable, 
but that do not work with microcredit, are used as a 
control group, and the effects of the regulatory changes 
are estimated in difference in differences models. The 
conditions that enable causal inferences and the limitations 
of “quasi-experimental” strategies, such as that used in this 
research, are discussed, for example, in Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell (2002). In the microfinance and microcredit 
segment, various studies have adopted similar strategies 
with the aim of identifying causal effects (Cozarenco 
& Szafarz, 2014; Ledgerwood, 1999). Yet, as far as we 
know, the application of this strategy to investigate the 
performance of credit unions is unprecedented. 
The results suggest that the performance of the credit 
unions that work with microcredit was significantly 
affected by the changes associated with the advent of 
the Crescer program, especially in its social dimension. 
Considering the breadth of coverage indicators of the 
credit unions, a significant increase in the number of 
clients served is documented, as well as the number of 
credit operations carried out, possibly as a response to the 
governmental intervention, in a way that is compatible 
with the program’s stated objectives. A reduction in 
the average value of credit operations is also observed, 
which is evidence that is compatible with a concentrated 
expansion in microcredit operations. In contrast, there is 
no evidence of any impact of the program over the ratio 
between the quantity of operations and the number of 
clients. This result is not compatible with increasing the 
depth of coverage, a dimension that is related to serving 
the “poorest among the poorest” (Bassem, 2009; Conning, 
1999; Hartarska, 2005).
There is no evidence that the quality of the credit 
portfolio has deteriorated as a result of the event in 
question. The results suggest that its influence over the 
default rate of the credit unions is insignificant, despite 
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the growth in credit operations and in the number of 
clients, as well as the reduction in the average value of 
the operations. In the profitability dimension, there is 
evidence that the volume of credit grew more quickly 
than the income from credit operations, a result that is 
compatible with charging borrowers lower interest rates. 
On the other hand, the estimated effect of the changes 
is not significant for six other profitability indicators, 
including return on assets (ROA) and return on net equity 
(ROE), suggesting that the changes in the regulatory and 
institutional environment for microcredit did not clearly 
affect the financial sustainability of the credit unions. In 
accordance with this inference, the estimates suggest more 
rapid growth in the operating revenues in comparison 
with the operating expenses of the credit unions as a 
result of the event. Considered altogether, the evidence 
is compatible with an expansion in microcredit on the 
part of the credit unions, though carried out cautiously, 
without compromising the financial sustainability of these 
institutions and without necessarily reaching the lowest 
income borrowers, although the data do not allow for 
this last conjecture to be tested directly.
The rest of the text is structured in the following way: 
section 2 presents the overview of microfinance and credit 
unions; section 3 describes NOPMP/Crescer and their 
possible influence over the performance of credit unions; 
section 4 presents the design of the empirical research; 
section 5 presents, analyzes, and discusses the results 
of the study; and, finally, section 6 presents the paper’s 
concluding remarks.
2. MICROFINANCE AND CREDIT UNIONS
Microfinance consists of the provision of financial 
services in general: savings, insurance, as well as credit 
in all its modalities (consumption, housing etc.) for the 
low income population and for microentrepreneurs. 
Microcredit is one of the products of microfinance and 
refers to all the credit modalities offered to this same 
public. According to Soares and Melo Sobrinho (2008), 
productive and oriented microcredit is that which is 
directed exclusively toward productive activities, excluding 
credit for consumption.
For Gonzalez, Righetti, and Di Serio (2014), the 
successful microcredit programs already studied indicate 
the existence of specific characteristics, which are: (i) the 
use of a solidary group, also known as joint liability; (ii) 
strong female participation; (iii) a focus on poor regions. 
These characteristics of microcredit and microfinance, 
also called methodologies or technologies, are what 
differentiate contemporary experiences of microcredit 
from older ones. Joint liability consists of a loan in 
groups of three or more members in which one backs 
the other, thus creating co-responsibility within the group, 
since non-payment of the loan by any of the members 
compromises the group as a whole. This mechanism not 
only substitutes the real guarantees but also monitoring of 
the loan, since the borrowers themselves take responsibility 
for this, instead of the institution. In addition to these 
technologies are the innovations related to information 
and communication technology (ICT), indicated by 
Gonzalez, Diniz, and Pozzebon (2015) as drivers of new 
microfinance business models, which should contribute 
to the challenge of reconciling development and profits 
in what has been conventionally called inclusive finance. 
One example of these innovations is the operation of 
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB), which carries out 
many of its microcredit operations via the post office, 
which drastically reduces transaction costs (Littlefield, 
Morduch & Hashemi, 2003).
Microcredit technologies were created and 
disseminated based on the experience of Grameen Bank. 
Although group lending have seen a rapid expansion 
since the start of the 1970s, through the work of the 
United Nations (UN) in Brazil, and of Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh, this concept dates back to the 19th century 
(Bastelaer, 2000). The author attributes the origin of this 
technology to the credit unions created by Raiffeisen, in 
Germany, in the middle of the 19th century, which became 
known as “banks of the people”, especially for practicing 
group lending whose criteria were: residency in small 
rural communities, a guarantee by the members, and co-
responsibility of the colleagues for the loans (Bastelaer, 
2000). Another microfinance technology relates to 
progressive loans or dynamic incentives, which consist 
of granting increasing loans conditioned on repayment 
of previous ones (Neri & Medrado, 2010). In the case 
of default, the loans are not renewed. This possibility of 
non-renewal works as an incentive for payment. 
The institutional environment for microfinance has its 
own logic and differentiated institutions. Microfinance 
institutions are defined by Morduch (1999) as specialized 
financial institutions (FIs), united under the banner of 
microfinance, which share the commitment to work 
toward financial inclusion. Ledgerwood (1999) refers to 
these as financial services providers to the poor, especially 
credit and saving.
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Specifically regarding credit unions, these differ from 
other FIs in terms of decision making, according to 
Railienė and Sinevičienė (2015). Thus, while the typical 
FI aims to increase shareholder value, credit unions enable 
a return for their members by providing financial services 
in more favorable conditions because they simultaneously 
have economic and social objectives.
The relevance of credit unions for microfinance is 
highlighted by Ward and McKillop (2005), who consider 
that the specific characteristics of this type of institution 
contribute to reducing information asymmetry, enabling 
them to provide loans in a way and in places that other 
FIs cannot, thus making them a potential instrument of 
financial inclusion.
Credit unions in Brazil resemble some specific types 
of MFIs because they do not seek profit. At the same time, 
they have similarities with conventional banks because 
they are, besides the banks, the only type of FI that is 
legally authorized by the CB to collect deposits (cash 
or term) from the public. Thus, they present a suitable 
institutional format for providing financial services to 
poor populations, since they are not for profit, at the same 
time as performing the role of financial intermediary. 
Another aspect that differentiates credit unions from 
other types of FIs is the fact that they constitute a local 
structure that combines activities of a financial and social 
nature, as well as presenting organizational characteristics 
based on mutuality and self-management, which enable 
the selection and monitoring of credit, also reducing 
operating costs (Schroder, 2005).
As the main aim of microcredit and microfinance 
is to reach the poorest, credit unions play a potentially 
important role as they spread throughout the entire 
country, even reaching the most distant and least 
economically privileged municipalities. 
3. NOPMP/CRESCER AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CREDIT UNIONS
Considered as the most recent change in the Brazilian 
microfinance sector, the NOPMP is classified by the 
Ministry of Employment as a job and income creating 
program and it is considered as both an economic 
policy (it aims to create jobs and income) and a social 
policy (it is aimed at the poorest layers of society: the 
unemployed, underemployed, self-employed, individual 
microentrepreneurs, and microenterprises).
According to the NOPMP Law – Law n. 11,110, 
of April 25th of 2005, the aims of the program are: (i) 
to incentivize the creation of jobs and income among 
common microentrepreneurs; (ii) to make resources 
available for oriented productive microcredit (OPC); 
and (iii) to offer technical support to OPM institutions, 
aiming to strengthen these institutions to provide 
mainstream entrepreneurial services. For the Ministry 
of Employment, OPM is the granting of credit aimed at 
small scale, formal and informal productive activities 
developed by individuals and companies, with an annual 
gross income of up to 120 thousand reais. The law foresees 
the monitoring of the operation by a credit agent who is 
properly trained for this role.
Within the scope of the NOPMP, the maximum value 
of credit is two thousand reais for individuals and five 
thousand reais for microentrepreneurs. The maximum 
opening credit rate allowed is 2% for individuals and 3% 
for microentrepreneurs. The interest charged is, at most, 
2% a month. For OPM, one of the lines of the NOPMP, 
the limit for granted credit is up to 15 thousand reais, 
with an opening credit rate of up to 3% a month and 
interest rate of up to 4% a month. Only OPM foresees 
the monitoring of a credit agent [Law n. 11,110, of April 
25th of 2005, Provisional Measure n. 543 (August 25th, 
2011), Law n. 12,613, of April 18th of 2012 (April 19th, 
2012), Law n. 12,666, of June 14th of 2012 (June 15th, 
2012), Ordinance n. 411 (June 17th, 2013), Ordinance n. 
83 (March 31st, 2014)]. In 2011, the NOPMP underwent 
changes that resulted in the creation of Crescer – the 
National Microcredit Program. Crescer, considered as an 
expansion of the NOPMP, was launched via Provisional 
Measure n. 543 (August 25th, 2011), subsequently made 
into law as part of the urban productive inclusion actions 
of the Secretariat for Economic Policy (SPE) of the 
Treasury Ministry, aiming to promote the emancipation 
of the beneficiaries of the Brazil Without Misery program. 
According to the SPE (2012), the general aim of the 
program is to raise living standards and create jobs within 
the context of Brazil Without Misery and, specifically: (i) 
to give an opportunity to new businesses; (ii) to encourage 
entrepreneurialism; and (iii) to encourage bank usage. The 
Crescer program was regulated by Resolution n. 4,000 of 
the CB (CB, 2011).
For the purposes of the program, the concept of OPM 
was defined as credit for entrepreneurs with a gross 
annual income of up to 120 thousand reais (the same 
range established by the NOPMP). The beneficiaries can 
be private individuals, individual entreprepreneurs, or 
microenterprises. The value of the operations is up to 15 
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thousand reais, the average timeframe is 6 months, and 
they can be targeted at working capital or investment. 
The methodology adopted by the Crescer program is: 
(i) a direct relationship with the entrepreneurs in the 
place of the economic activity; (ii) a service provided by 
trained people (credit agents); (iii) permanent contact 
for monitoring and orientation; (iv) evaluation of the 
borrower’s activity and capacity for debt. Regarding 
the guarantees, three modalities were established: joint 
liability for lower value operations; the goods themselves 
acquired in the lower value operations and targeted at 
investments; or, also, third-party guarantee. The federal 
public banks were strongly recommended to convert their 
consumption microcredit portfolios into OPM, with a 
reduction in interest from 60% a year (p.a.) to 8% p.a. 
The OCR was reduced from 3% to 1%.
Thus, the project was, initially, run by federal public 
banks (BASA, BB, CEF, and BNB), which had targets to 
be met in relation to the number of active clients – 2.24 
million for 2012 and 3.46 million for 2013 – and to the 
total active portfolio – 1.73 billion reais in 2012 and 2.99 
billion reais in 2013 (SPE, 2012). However, subsidies 
could be granted by the National Treasury to any FI that 
operated within the conditions defined for the program 
and agreed with the equalization (compensation) values 
defined by the Treasury Ministry. With this, it was hoped 
that the program would also be run by private institutions, 
thus increasing the volume of resources available and the 
number of entrepreneurs benefiting. The funding is the 
same as the NOPMP, which is the Workers’ Support Fund 
(FAT) and a portion of the cash deposits, in accordance 
with Law n. 11,110, of April 25th of 2005.
According to the regulations set out by Resolution 
n. 4,000 of the CB (CB, 2011), microcredit operations 
can be carried out with urban and rural entrepreneurs, 
individuals or companies and independent of the funding. 
What defines the operation as OPM is the methodology 
adopted in granting the credit. The same CB resolution 
also established that the borrower of microcredit can 
have more than one financing operation in the banking 
system as long as, in total, they do not exceed 20 thousand 
reais. The Crescer program was limited to 15 thousand 
reais per operation. 
Crescer aligns with other programs, such as Brazil 
without Misery, as part of a set of Federal Government 
policies that aim to create jobs and income, especially 
in the group of recipients of the Bolsa Familia Program, 
seeking to help with the emancipation of the families 
supported. The main change of Crescer in relation to the 
NOPMP was a reduction in the interest rate, from up to 
60% p.a. to 8% p.a., and of the OCR, which fell from 3% to 
1% on the value of the credit. In addition, the government 
committed to subsidizing the participants by allocating 
up to 500 million reais a year for equalization of interest, 
with resources paid monthly by the National Treasury. 
The payment of the subsidy was based on the number, 
value, and timeframe of the operations contracted by the 
microcredit institutions (MCIs) in general that opted to 
adhere to the program. For this, the government issued 
Ordinance n. 271 (July 30th, 2012) authorizing the Union 
to grant the aforementioned economic subsidy, with the 
hope of encouraging the adhesion of private banks and 
credit unions to Crescer. 
In effect, the regulatory changes in microcredit 
analyzed by this study, especially the reduction of interest 
rates and the creation of subsidies, could directly and 
indirectly affect the institutions granting this modality of 
credit. Specifically, this research investigates the effects of 
these changes on the (financial and social) performance 
of the credit unions linked to microcredit.
With regard to the metrics used to measure the 
financial performance of MFIs, few divergences were 
found in the papers analyzed. In general, accounting 
indicators are used, the most classic ones being ROA, 
ROE, operating cost, and default rate (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010; Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Bédécarrats, 
Baur & Lapenu, 2011; Kipesha & Zhang, 2013).
The groups of indicators analyzed in this study are 
consistent with the literature referenced, as well as the 
indicators created by the Social Performance Task Force 
(SPTF) and summarized by the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX). The MIX has summarized these aspects 
into four groups, namely: quality of assets, efficiency and 
productivity, financial management, and profitability. 
For the purposes of this research, the data gathered only 
allowed for those belonging to three of these groups to be 
analyzed, as it was not possible to construct productivity 
indicators. 
Regarding the MFI social performance measures, only 
at the start of the 2000s did initiatives emerge to promote 
the development of tools for measurement and social 
performance management, the first initiative being that 
of the SPTF (Bédécarrats et al., 2011). The most widely 
employed metrics in the previous studies are varied (Borba, 
2012; Meyer, 2002; Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
Vega & Rodriguez-Meza, 2000). According to Quayes 
(2012), the most widely used MFI social performance 
dimensions are breadth of coverage and depth of coverage 
of microcredit. Breadth of coverage means making the 
social benefits of microcredit available for the greatest 
possible number of clients (Brau & Woller, 2004; Schreiner 
& Yaron, 1999), and depth of coverage relates to how 
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much microcredit really reaches “the poorest among the 
poorest” (Bassem, 2009; Conning, 1999; Hartarska, 2005).
To measure the breadth of coverage, the most widely 
used variables in the previous studies are: the number of 
clients covered; the average loan value; and the percentage 
of female borrowers (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2008; Kar, 
2010; Luzzi & Weber, 2006, 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; 
Rosenberg, 2009). As a proxy for the depth of coverage, 
Quayes (2012) used the average loan size per borrower. 
This research uses the definitions and some of the proxies 
for measuring social performance (breadth and depth 
of coverage) used by Quayes (2012). However, the data 
available do not allow for the borrowers’ gender to be 
identified.
Considering that credit unions are small or medium 
sized FIs, it is important to investigate whether and 
how the new rules affected their financial and social 
performance. The financial performance and, therefore, 
the sustainability of the credit unions involved with 
microcredit could be affected in three aspects: (i) a 
substantial increase in cost if, as the regulators hoped, 
consumption microcredit was replaced by productive 
microcredit, since OPM operations are more expensive 
due to the credit monitoring technology; (ii) a fall in the 
revenue from microcredit operations, as a result of the 
reduction in the interest rate and the OCR; (iii) a change 
in the default rate, which could fall if the lower interest 
rates raise the probability of borrowers paying the loan, 
or increase if there is a sufficiently wide expansion in 
credit for clients with a poorer risk profile.
Thus, even with the financial rewards offered by the 
government for operations within the scope of Crescer, 
it is possible that its net effect on financial performance 
is negative, if these are not enough to offset potential 
reductions in revenue, an increase in costs, and increase 
in defaults. 
On the other hand, the new rules are expected to 
have a positive impact over the number of clients and 
productive microcredit operations, contributing to the 
better social performance of credit unions. However, the 
magnitude of the effect must depend on the impact of 
Crescer over the financial sustainability of credit unions 
and over the behavior of other credit market agents, for 
example public banks and private banks.
The types of institutions that supply microcredit 
in Brazil range from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to development banks. It is known that NGOs 
were not included in the NOPMP. Credit unions act within 
the NOPMP and Crescer in two different ways: lending 
directly to the final borrower with their own resources 
and also as an intermediary, receiving transfers from 
other FIs via microcredit interfinancial deposits (MIDs).
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study explores the exogenous shock to the 
regulatory and institutional environment for microcredit 
associated with the advent of Crescer in 2011 as a natural 
experiment. Natural experiments in the area of applied 
social sciences, in general, are used when some exogenous 
phenomenon, for example a governmental intervention, 
changes the institutional environment where individuals, 
families, companies, and/or municipalities operate 
(Wooldridge, 2010).
In the microfinance and microcredit segment at a 
worldwide level, some studies have used the combination 
of a natural experiment with difference in differences 
estimations (Cozarenco & Szafarz, 2014; Ledgerwood, 
1999). Yet, in research on microfinance and microcredit in 
Brazil, this strategy has still barely been explored. One of 
the studies identified is that of Neri and Medrado (2010), 
which investigated the impact of the Crediamigo program, 
of BNB, on access to credit in that region. However, as 
far as we know, this research is the first to investigate the 
performance of credit unions that work with microcredit 
using the difference in differences estimation procedure. 
The database made available by the CB is unique and 
composed of data extracted from the Credit Information 
System (SCR) and from the Chart of Accounts for 
Institutions of the National Financial System (COSIF). 
4.1 Characterization of the Population 
(Treatment Group and Control Group)
One of the main assumptions of the difference in 
differences model is that of “parallel trends”. This 
implies that the evolution of the response variables in 
the treatment and control groups, in the absence of the 
occurrence of the event of interest, would be similar 
(parallel), unconditionally or conditioned to the set of 
control variables included in the estimated model. It is 
worth mentioning that, for simplicity and following the 
literature from the area, we used the terms treatment 
and control to characterize the groups, although they 
are more suitable for controlled experiments. Under this 
assumption, it is possible to identify the causal effect of the 
exogenous event, even if the treatment and control groups 
differ systematically in various characteristics (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008). So, if the assumption of parallel trends is 
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reasonable, it is possible to capture the direct and indirect 
effects of the changes in the regulatory and institutional 
environment for microcredit over the financial and social 
performance of credit unions (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2010). The direct and indirect impacts for 
credit unions of the aforementioned changes, especially 
the reduction in interest rates and the OCR, the creation 
of subsidies to equalize the rates of those that adhere to the 
Crescer program, and the strong stimulus for increasing 
the participation of the public banks in this segment, are 
identified altogether. It is not possible to identify the effect 
of each component of the set, since the available data do 
not allow for the channel responsible for the estimated 
effect to be isolated.
The credit unions chosen for the treatment group are 
those that work with microcredit and provided credit in 
this modality during the period studied. It is important 
to mention that the credit unions in the treatment group 
supplied microcredit before the regulatory changes. The 
control group is composed of the credit unions that did 
not provide microcredit at any time during the sampling 
period and, therefore, should not be affected by the event 
in question.
An indicator of comparability between the groups is the 
coincidence of the most frequent types of credit unions: 
both the control and the treatment group contemplate 
two of the most frequent types, which are free admission 
credit unions, located in municipalities with up to 300 
thousand inhabitants, and rural credit unions. It is worth 
mentioning that the data on rural credit unions, both those 
from the Ministry of Employment database and from the 
CB database, refer exclusively to the provision of OPM, 
not including the National Program for Strengthening 
Family Agriculture (Pronaf). Pronaf is a rural credit 
program, and rural credit in Brazil has specific legislation 
and methodologies, which differ from the microcredit 
analyzed here, which is predominantly urban.
Another reason for the plausibility of the comparison 
between the groups is the fact that all the credit unions 
work with various modalities of credit, unlike some MFIs, 
such as the Civil Society Organizations of Public Interest 
(OSCIPs) and the Credit Societies for Microentrepreneurs 
(SCMs), which only operate with microcredit.
Finally, the main similarities between the (treatment 
and control) groups are: (i) the credit unions are 
institutions with the same legal nature; (ii) they have 
the same objectives; (iii) they provide the same types of 
products and services (credit), fundamentally differing 
with relation to the modalities of credit provided.
Although the credit unions included in the treatment 
and control groups are comparable, it is not possible to 
definitively test the parallel trends assumption. In fact, 
graphic evaluations and mean equality tests suggest that 
the evolution of some of the performance indicators used 
in this research was similar in the two groups of credit 
unions in the periods before the advent of Crescer, but 
the results of these diagnostics are not homogenous. For 
that reason, to reduce the potential for distortion of the 
inferences as a result of endogeneity problems (in this 
case, violation of the parallel trends assumption), the main 
estimated models described below include additional 
controls. In particular, these models isolate potentially 
divergent trends in the performance indicators caused by 
differences in size of the credit unions in the treatment 
and control groups. 
4.2 Specification of the Empirical Model
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel, containing 
14 semesters with 1,429 credit unions per semester, 
on average. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed 
effects (FE) estimators are employed to estimate similar 
regression models to the one described by equation 1. 
This study used six time periods before the event and 
six after, given that the period studied was from 2008 to 
2014, with half-yearly data. 
In the model above, yit represents the performance 
indicator of credit union i in period t, CRESCERt is a 
dummy vairable, such that CRESCERt = 0 in the periods 
prior to the change in the microcredit environment 
associated with the advent of the Crescer program 
(occurring in 2011) and CRESCERt =1 in the periods after 
the aforementioned change, MCi is a group dummy, such 
that MCi = 1 if credit union 1 operates with microcredit 
and MCi = 0 otherwise, (MC × CRESCER)it is the variable 
of interest and represents the interaction of the two 
dummies, such that (MC × CRESCER)it = 1 only for the 
credit unions that do microcredit observed in the periods 
after the regulatory change and (MC × CRESCER)it = 0 
otherwise, TRENDt , LTAPiPRE and (LTAP PRE × TREND)it 
are control variables. TRENDt is a deterministic indicator 
of trend, taking the value from 1 to 14 (semesters), so that 
its coefficient captures any upward or downward trend 
in the mean of yit for the set of credit unions. LTAPiPRE 
is the natural logarithm of the mean value of the credit 
portfolio computed in the period prior to the regulatory 
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changes. This variable captures preexisting differences 
in size and volume of the credit operation of the credit 
unions. LTAPiPRE is systematically greater in the group 
of credit unions that operate with microcredit. Setting 
the value of the control variable in the pre-treatment 
period is important, in this case, because the regulatory 
changes in microcredit can influence the total volume of 
credit provided by the credit union in the post-treatment 
period. For this reason, using LTAPit would be unsuitable 
[a case of bad control, as described by Angrist and Pischke 
(2008)]. The interaction (LTAP PRE × TREND)it isolates 
any different trends in yit associated with preexisting 
differences in size and volume of credit of the credit 
unions. This control may be relevant, since the average 
size in the period prior to the regulatory changes differs 
systematically between the treatment and control groups. 
Finally, uit is the error term of the model. The parameter 
of interest is β3, which captures, under the assumption of 
parallel trends (conditioned on the control variables), the 
effect of the regulatory change over the performance of 
the credit unions that work with microcredit. Different 
versions of this model were estimated in this research, for 
example, without control variables or using a complete 
set of time dummies, as well as the estimation by FE 
methods instead of estimation by OLS [Wooldridge (2010) 
discusses the potential gain in efficiency with the use of 
the FE estimator].
4.3 Description of the Variables Used
The dependent variables include the financial 
performance and social performance indicators of the 
credit unions described in Table 1. The indicators of the 
first group were, based on the literature, divided into three 
groups: quality of assets, efficiency, and profitability. Social 
performance, in turn, contemplates two dimensions: 
breadth of coverage and depth of coverage.
Table 1
Financial and social performance indicators
Group Indicator Calculation method
Financial indicators
Quality of assets
DEF Defaults – Portfolio at Risk > 90 days Balance of overdue loans > 90 days
RT_DEF Rate of default Balance of overdue loans > 90 days ÷ Total active portfolio
Profitability
PROF_PORT Profitability of credit portfolio Income from credit operations ÷ Classified credit portfolio
INC_IN
Income from interest on credit 
operations in relation to adjusted total 
assets
Income from interest on credit operations ÷ Adjusted total assets (annual)
FIN_MARG Financial intermediation margin 6-month income from financial intermediation ÷ 6-month operating revenue
INCOME_FIN Income from financial intermediation Financial intermediation revenues – Financial intermediation expenses
INCOME_FIN_IN
Income from financial intermediation 
(interest only)
Financial intermediation revenues – Financial intermediation expenses 
(considering only income from interest)
ROA ROA – Return on assets (Net operating income, adjusted – Taxes) ÷ Adjusted average total assets
ROE ROE – Return on net equity
(Net operating income, adjusted – Taxes) ÷ Adjusted average net income from 
the semester
Efficiency
OP_MARG Operating margin 6-month operating income ÷ 6-month operating revenue
OP_COST Operating cost
Administrative expenses ÷ (Income from financial intermediation + revenue 
from services)
Social indicators
Breadth of coverage
CLIEN Total clients
Quantity of active clients in the semester by modalities: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
submodalities 1303 and 1304, 212, loans (consumption microcredit) and 
403, financing (productive microcredit)
OPER Total number of operations
Quantity of operations carried out in the semester by modalities: 1, 2, 3, 4 
and submodalities 1303 and 1304, 212, loans (consumption microcredit) and 
403, financing (productive microcredit)
Depth of coverage
ME_CLIEN
Mean number of operations per 
borrower
[Quantity of operations carried out in the semester by modalities: 1, 2, 3, 4 
and submodalities 1303 and 1304, 212, loans (consumption microcredit) and 
403, financing (productive microcredit)] ÷ Total active clients in the semester
ME_POR Mean value per operation Total active portfolio in the semester ÷ Quantity of operations in the semester
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and Quayes (2012).
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5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A descriptive analysis of the original data identified 
a significant set of outliers. To attenuate the influence 
of extreme observations over the inferences, all the 
continuous variables were winsorized. This procedure 
consists of replacing the extreme values, in this case 
10% of the lowest and the highest values, with the values 
adjacent to the established limit. For some of the variables 
measured in reais, the logarithmic transformation was 
also applied, namely: total asset portfolio (TAP); income 
from financial intermediation (INCOME_FIN); income 
from financial intermediation considering only interest 
(INCOME_FIN_IN); and total defaults (DEF). Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics of the variables.
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable
Observations*
(n)
Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
LTAP 17,007 7.544 1.630 4.821 9.975
Financial indicators
ROA 17,006 0.089 0.091 -0.036 0.261
FIN_MARG 17,006 0.548 0.207 0.260 0.908
OP_MARG 17,006 0.183 0.178 -0.077 0.521
OP_COST 17,007 0.719 0.259 0.354 1.219
PORT_PROF 17,007 0.123 0.038 0.067 0.193
ROE 17,007 0.271 0.242 -0.100 0.702
INC_IN 17,007 0.358 0.169 0.132 0.654
INCOME_FIN 16,670 5.363 1.367 3.187 7.482
INCOME_FIN_IN 16,682 5.384 1.369 3.211 7.514
DEF 15,163 3.767 1.692 1.024 6.363
RT_DEF 17,007 0.027 0.029 0.000 0.095
Social indicators
CLIEN 16,994 1,966.98 2,169.21 202 7.020
OPER 16,994 3,439.68 3,933.73 278 12.477
ME_CLIEN 16,994 1.672 0.958 1.000 3.959
ME_POR 16,993 7.428 1.463 5.106 9.690
The sample covers all the credit unions of the National Financial System with information available for the period from 2008 
to 2014, in semesters, totaling 1,429 credit unions observed for 14 semesters. The variables INCOME_FIN, INCOME_FIN_IN, 
and DEF were transformed by logarithm. All the variables were winsorized at 10%. The nominal variables were deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (IPCA) [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)].
CLIEN = total clients; OP_COST = operating cost; DEF = log of defaults – portfolio at risk > 90 days; LTAP = log of the portfolio 
of loan assets (control variable); FIN_MARG = financial intermediation margin; OP_MARG = operating margin; ME_POR = 
mean value per operation; ME_CLIEN = mean number of operations per borrower; OPER = total operations; INCOME_IN = 
income from interest on credit operations in relation to adjusted total assets; PROF_PORT = profitability of the credit portfolio; 
INCOME_FIN = log of income from financial intermediation; INCOME_FIN_IN = log of income from financial intermediation 
(only considering interest); ROA – return on assets; ROE – return on net equity; RT_DEF = rate of default. 
* Number of credit unions multiplied by the number of time periods.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
It is observed that the mean financial intermediation 
margin (FIN_MARG) is greater than the operating margin 
(OP_MARG), recording 0.548 and 0.183, respectively; both 
are lower than the operating cost (OP_COST), which presents 
a mean of 0.719 and standard deviation of 0.259. The mean 
income from interest (INCOME_IN) is 0.358, which in turn 
represents 6.67% of the income from financial intermediation 
(INCOME_FIN), which is 5.363 and 6.64% of the mean 
for the variable INCOME_FIN_IN (income from financial 
intermediation considering only interest), which is 5.384.
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Regarding the social indicators, the mean number of 
clients (CLIEN) is 1,966.98, with a standard deviation 
of 2,169.21; the mean number of operations (OPER) 
is 3,439.68, with a standard deviation of 3,933.73. The 
mean number of operations per borrower is 1.672, with 
a standard deviation of 0.958.
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates based on equation 
2, using the FE estimator.
In this specification, the variables shown in equation 
1, which do not vary in time (MCi and LTAPiPRE), are 
suppressed by the intragroup transformation used to 
eliminate ci , a term that represents the unobserved 
heterogeneity of credit union i (i.e., credit unions fixed 
effects). In turn, ci captures the association between the 
mean of yit and any characteristics of the credit unions 
that did not vary during the sampling period. Similarly, 
the variables that do not vary between credit unions 
(CRESCERt and TRENDt) are excluded as they are 
perfectly collinear with the set of semester dummies 
SEMjt, j = 1, ... , 14 (in practice, since the model includes an 
intercept, the first semester dummy is also excluded from 
the regressions). The coefficient of interest in this model is 
represented by δ1, which has the same interpretation of β3 
in equation 1. Again, the interaction (LTAP PRE × TREND)it 
captures any differences in trend in yit associated with 
preexisting differences in size and volume of credit of the 
credit unions. To save space, tables 2 and 3 only report 
the coefficient of interest δ1, estimated in regressions 
represented by equation 2, using each one of the indicators 
described in Table 1 as a response variable.
Table 3
Regression based on equation 2 – Financial indicators
Response variable
Coefficient
(MC × CRESCER)
Observations
(n)
Credit Unions
(n)
R-sq.
Quality of assets
Defaults (DEF)
0.131*
(0.072)
15,019 1,330 0.035
Rate of default (RT_DEF)
-0.0007
(0.001)
16,837 1,392 0.003
Profitability
Profitability of the credit portfolio (PROF_
PORT)
-0.003**
(0.001)
16,837 1,392 0.075
Income from interest on assets (INCOME_IN)
-0.008
(0.007)
16,837 1,392 0.050
Financial intermediation margin (FIN_MARG)
0.002
(0.006)
16,836 1,392 0.003
Income from financial intermediation 
(INCOME_FIN)
0.046
(0.038)
16,511 1,386 0.024
Income from financial intermediation (interest) 
(INCOME_FIN_IN)
0.057
(0.038)
16,522 1,386 0.027
Return on assets (ROA)
-0.002
(0.004)
16,836 1,392 0.010
Return on net equity (ROE)
-0.001
(0.014)
16,837 1,392 0.026
Efficiency
Operating margin (OP_MARG)
0.011**
(0.005)
16,836 1,392 0.006
Operating cost (OP_COST)
-0.012
(0.009)
16,837 1,392 0.049
This table shows the results of estimations of equation 2 using the fixed effects (FEs) estimator. The response variables are 
described in Table 1. To save space, the table only reports the estimates for the coefficient of interest, associated with the 
interaction (MC × CRESCER)it (δ1 in equation 2). All the continuous variables were winsorized and the nominal variables were 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index (IPCA) [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)]. Standard errors clustered by 
credit union, asymptomatically robust to arbitrary forms of autocorrection and heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** = statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Considering the indicators related to the quality of 
the assets, Table 3 shows a significant increase in the 
balance of loans overdue by more than 90 days (DEF) for 
the credit unions that work with microcredit (treatment 
group) in comparison with those that do not work with 
microcredit (control group) in the period after the 
changes associated with Crescer. However, the default 
rate (loans overdue by more than 90 days divided by the 
total active portfolio) evolves in a similar way for the 
two groups in the periods before and after the event, as 
the estimate for the coefficient δ1 close to 0 shows, with 
a t statistic equally close to 0. These combined results 
are compatible with the hypothesis that the volume 
of credit provided by the credit unions in the control 
group increased as a result of the implementation of 
Crescer, and for this reason their total defaults also 
increased. Therefore, there is evidence that Crescer 
positively influenced the provision of microcredit 
without simultaneously causing a relevant deterioration 
in the quality of the credit portfolio of the credit unions.
Regarding the profitability of the credit unions, of 
the seven indicators evaluated, only one appears to 
have been significantly affected by the changes in the 
microcredit environment. Specifically, it is observed 
that the profitability of the credit portfolio decreases 
in the post-treatment period for the credit unions that 
work with microcredit in comparison with other credit 
unions. In light of the inferences about the quality of 
the assets discussed here, this result suggests that the 
volume of credit grew more quickly than the income 
from credit operations, possibly due to the lower interest 
rates associated with microcredit operations. However, 
the lack of statistical significance of the estimates at the 
conventional levels, associated with the other profitability 
indicators, suggests that any negative impact of the 
regulatory changes over the profitability of the credit 
unions is unclear or not very relevant, possibly because 
the volume of operations linked to the new rules is not 
enough to affect the overall financial performance of 
the credit unions. In particular, the estimates of δ1 (and 
its t statistic) obtained when ROA or ROE is used as a 
response variable are close to 0.
The results shown in Table 3 are compatible with an 
increase in the efficiency of the credit unions associated 
with the advent of Crescer. In particular, the significant 
increase in the operating margin (positive estimated 
coefficient significant at the 5% level) suggests that the 
mean operating revenue of the treatment group grew 
more than its operating expenses in comparison with 
the control group. When the response variable is the 
operating cost indicator (administrative expenses divided 
by the income from financial intermediation and revenue 
from services), the estimate of the coefficient of interest 
is negative, but not significant at the conventional levels.
Table 4
Regressions based on equation 2 – Social indicators
Response variable
Coefficient
(MC × CRESCER)
Observations
(n)
Credit Unions
(n)
R-sq.
Breadth of coverage
Total clients (CLIEN) 479.61***
(115.02)
16,824 1,392 0.338
Total operations (OPER) 1421.48***
(204.29)
16,824 1,392 0.334
Depth of coverage
Operations per borrower 
(n) (ME_CLIEN)
0.072
(0.050)
16,824 1,392 0.034
Mean value per operation 
(ME_POR)
-0.0004*
(0.0002)
16,823 1,392 0.262
This table shows the results of estimations of equation 2 using the fixed effects (FEs) estimator. The response variables are 
described in Table 1. To save space, the table only reports the estimates for the coefficient of interest, associated with the 
interaction (MC × CRESCER)it (δ1 in equation 2). All the continuous variables were winsorized and the nominal variables were 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index (IPCA) [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)]. Standard errors clustered by 
credit union, asymptomatically robust to arbitrary forms of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** = statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimations using four 
social performance indicators. The first two relate to the 
breadth of coverage of the credit unions, focusing on the 
total number of clients (CLIEN) and the total number 
of credit operations (OPER), including microcredit and 
the other modalities offered by the institutions. In both 
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cases, the estimates suggest a positive and economically 
and statistically relevant impact (the estimated coefficient 
of interest is significant at the 1% level in all cases) of the 
regulatory changes associated with the Crescer program. 
The specification of the regressions (equation 2) ensures 
that this result is not due to previous differences in average 
size or volume of the portfolio of the treatment and control 
groups, nor to different growth trends for the response 
variables associated with previous differences in credit union 
size. The results therefore suggest that the Crescer program 
caused a significant increase in the number of clients and 
operations of the credit unions linked to microcredit.
The depth of coverage indicators, on the other hand, 
focus on the relationship between the quantity of credit 
operations and the total number of clients (ME_CLIEN) 
and the relationship between the total value of the 
portfolio and the quantity of credit operations (ME_POR). 
In the second case, the negative estimate significant at 
the 10% level for the coefficient of interest suggests that 
Crescer contributed to the quantity of credit operations 
increasing more quickly than the total value of the credit 
portfolio, which is a compatible result with a reduction 
in the average size of the credit operations caused by 
the provision of lower value loans. On the other hand, 
there is no evidence that the expansion in the number 
of clients was more accelerated than the expansion in 
the number of operations, based on the result of the 
estimation using ME_CLIEN as a response variable (in 
fact, the positive estimation reported in the table suggests 
the opposite, although it is not statistically significant at 
the conventional levels). Therefore, it is unclear that the 
regulatory changes caused the credit unions that work 
with microcredit to expand their provision of credit to 
poorer clients (alternatively, the results suggest that, on 
average, the clients of these institutions may have had 
access to a greater number of lower value loans).
6. CONCLUSIONS
This research investigates the impact of the regulatory 
changes implemented in microcredit in 2011 over the 
financial and social performance of Brazilian credit 
unions. The results suggest that the volume of clients 
and of credit operations was positively affected by the 
changes analyzed. There is evidence of a reduction in the 
average value of the operations, as could be expected from 
an expansion concentraded in microcredit operations. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence that the increase in 
the volume of credit benefited poorer clients, although 
the data do not allow for this hypothesis to be tested 
directly. Therefore, the social performance of the credit 
unions that work with microcredit appears to have been 
positively affected but more so in the breadth dimension 
than in the depth of coverage dimension. 
Despite the significant growth in credit operations and 
number of clients and the reduction in the average value 
of the operations, there is no evidence of a deterioration 
in the quality of the credit portfolio of the credit unions, 
measured by its default rate. There is also no clear evidence 
that the profitability of the credit unions was affected by the 
event. Of the seven indicators evaluated, in only one is the 
coefficient of interest significant at the conventional levels – 
in this case, suggesting that the volume of credit grew more 
quickly than the income from credit operations, which is a 
compatible result with the charging of lower interest rates 
in the microcredit operations. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that operating revenues grew more quickly than 
operating expenses, suggesting that the changes did not 
cause a loss in efficiency for the credit unions that work 
with microcredit. Taken together, these results suggest 
that the governmental intervention in question did not 
compromise the financial sustainability of the credit unions. 
Although unreported descriptive analyses suggest that 
the credit unions included in the treatment and control 
groups are comparable, the uncertainty regarding the 
validity of the parallel trends assumption suggests caution 
in the causal inferences. It should also be mentioned that 
the credit unions choose whether to offer microcredit 
in the context of the NOPMP and Crescer programs or 
not. The credit unions that adhere possibly saw in these 
programs the opportunity to better achieve their social 
objectives, by increasing their provision of microcredit 
using their own resources, captured directly or derived 
from transfers. The absence of evidence of a deterioration 
in the financial sustainability of these institutions also 
suggests that, on average, the expansion of their operations 
took place in a cautious way, which is compatible with the 
low share of the segment in the total volume of microcredit 
operations carried out in Brazil.
Naturally, the results and conclusions of this research 
are limited by the information available. In particular, 
the databases used do not allow for a detailed analysis of 
how the credit operations are allocated into their various 
modalities and which publics are served by them. Future 
studies could complement the analysis presented here, by 
investigating in more depth the impact of microcredit on 
the communities that benefit from it, based on primary data 
produced via a questionnaire or in qualitative field research.
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